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BARLOW’S LEGACY 
CORY DOCTOROW 
“Who controls the past controls the future; who controls the 
present controls the past.”1 
And now we are come to the great techlash, long overdue and 
desperately needed. With the techlash comes the political contest to 
assemble the narrative of What Just Happened and How We Got Here, 
because “Who controls the past controls the future. Who controls the 
present controls the past.” 
Barlow is a key figure in that narrative, and so defining his 
legacy is key to the project of seizing the future. As we contest over that 
legacy, I will here set out my view on it. It’s an insider’s view: I met 
Barlow first through his writing, and then as a teenager on The WELL, 
and then at a dinner in London with Electronic Frontier Foundation 
(EFF) attorney Cindy Cohn (now the executive director of EFF), and 
then I worked with him, on and off, for more than a decade, through my 
work with EFF. He lectured to my students at USC, and wrote the 
introduction to one of my essay collections, and hung out with me at 
Burning Man, and we spoke on so many bills together, and I wrote him 
into one of my novels as a character, an act that he blessed. I emceed 
events where he spoke and sat with him in his hospital room as he lay 
dying. I make no claim to being Barlow’s best or closest friend, but I 
count myself mightily privileged to have been a friend, a colleague, and a 
protege of his.  
There is a story today about “cyber-utopians” told as a part of the 
techlash: Once, there were people who believed that the internet would 
automatically be a force for good. They told us all to connect to one 
another and fended off anyone who sought to rein in the power of the 
technology industry, naively ushering in an era of mass surveillance, 
monopolism, manipulation, even genocide. These people may have been 
well-intentioned, but they were smart enough that they should have 
known better, and if they hadn’t been so unforgivably naive (and, 
possibly, secretly in the pay of the future monopolists) we might not be 
in such dire shape today.  
In support of this contention, they cite aphorisms like “The Net 
interprets censorship as damage and routes around it,” coined by 
 
1 GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 331 (Outside The Box Ebook 
Publishing 2018) (1949) (ebook). 
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Barlow’s EFF-co-founder and erstwhile roommate John Gilmore who 
rivals Barlow for the title of internet zelig. Gilmore has a hand in the 
invention of the Free Software movement, the legalization of civilian 
access to cryptography, the ISP industry, commercial open source, 
software-defined radio, marijuana legalization, and a hundred other 
projects large and small. 
But context is everything: “The Net interprets censorship as 
damage and routes around it” was a prescription as much as an 
observation. It was uttered in the context of a nascent internet whose 
technical caretakers disagreed on many ethical and technical points, but 
were united in a sense of civic duty to keep the technology open and 
universal and “free as in freedom.” Gilmore didn’t mean, “Stand down 
everyone, we’ve built a censorship-proof internet that will automatically 
maintain its integrity.” He meant, “To you, my comrades-in-arms who 
toil endlessly to make our balky, wonderful invention run, I say: the 
same measures that we take to re-knit our network when a technical 
failure tears holes in its fabric can be repurposed to resist censorship, to 
route around the nodes that have fallen under a censor’s thrall. Our 
shared civic mission, heretofore dedicated primarily to the technical task 
of preserving a forum for discourse, can and should be expanded to the 
political task of preserving that forum, and what’s more, the tactics that 
we have mastered so thoroughly for the former will serve us in the 
latter.”  
Critics of political slogans take note: the fact that a complex idea 
is reduced to a pithy bumper-sticker is not (necessarily) reductive; it can 
be a necessary and extremely valuable convenience. A URL is not a 
web-page and even the best URL rarely substitutes for the page it refers 
to. But requiring us to forego pointers and deal only in things, to refer to 
web-pages solely by their complete texts rather than the brief summaries 
that unambiguously point to them, would be a hard discourse. 
When Barlow advocated for a free internet––“free” in all the 
usefully overlapping and ambiguous senses of that word––he wasn’t 
doing so because he lacked an appreciation of the risks of a monopolized 
internet, or an internet that was under the thumb of a repressive state. 
Rather, he did so precisely because he feared that a globe-spanning 
network of ubiquitous, sensor-studded, actuating devices that were 
designed and governed without some kind of ethical commitment, 
without the pioneering spirit of the early internet and its yeoman 
smallholders who defended it from those who sought to dominate or 
pervert it, that we would arrive at a dystopian future where the 
entertainment industry’s Huxelyism was the means for realizing the 
nightmares of Orwell. 
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You don’t found an organization like the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation because you are sanguine about the future of the internet: 
you do so because your hope for an amazing, open future is haunted by 
terror of a network suborned for the purposes of spying and control.  
 
“If there is hope . . . it lies in the proles”2 
The techlash began within tech. Naturally. Notwithstanding the 
genuine privilege-blindness of techies who often live in a bubble of 
weath, technological competence, and agency, no one was better situated 
to spot the problems with tech––market-concentration, the reckless 
collection and warehousing of sensitive personal information, deceptive 
and manipulative business practices, the misuse of tech by repressive 
states, bullies, stalkers, and would-be ethnic cleansers––than people who 
understood precisely how the technology worked, knew the people 
responsible for the key decisions, and understood their frailty and 
capacity for self-deception. 
These early coalmine canaries were atomized and isolated. At 
EFF, we heard from some of them: whistleblowers who came in with 
printouts and wild tales. Think of Mark Klein, who wandered through the 
front door of the old Shotwell Street office in San Francisco’s Mission 
district with a sheaf of documents and a hard-to-believe tale about his 
years at AT&T building a secret room for the NSA to use while illegally 
wiretapping the whole internet. Klein wasn’t a crank. He was a hero, and 
the litigation spawned by his act of bravery is still underway, more than a 
decade later. 
Tech is a great force-multiplier. The canny user of technology 
can project their will over millions or even billions of devices, and, 
potentially, over the people who use those devices, too. That kind of 
power is terrifying, especially in the hands of unaccountable, frail, and 
fallible elites.  
The project of teaching “STEM” to everyone did not begin as an 
attempt to maximize the national GDP by raising a generation of startup 
founders: it was a prescient attempt at self-defense, a mission to pluralize 
the power of tech.  
“Tech” is not a force unto itself. Technology’s imperatives are 
the imperatives of the people who design, control, and use technology. 
Information doesn’t want to be free, but people do. 
 
2 ORWELL, supra note 1, at 94.  
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Barlow loved people. When Skype was invented, he kept it 
turned on at all hours, and allowed anyone in the world to initiate a 
session with him. Some were colleagues, some were admirers, and a 
good fraction were randos who were just exploring this new 
videoconferencing system. Barlow doted on these randos, and 
rhapsodized about the joy of helping a stranger halfway across the world 
practice their conversational English. 
The last time I spoke with Barlow, as he lay in a hospital bed in 
San Francisco, he told me that if he ever got out, he wanted to go drive a 
car for Lyft, and just meet new people all day long and talk to them about 
what they wanted and what he wanted and make human connections.  
Barlow was not naive about the ways in which humans could be 
terrible to other people and themselves. His posthumously published 
memoir, finished just weeks before he died, is simultaneously full of 
celebrations of the people who crossed his path and score-settling that 
verges on the unseemly or petty.  
It’s just that Barlow thought that the answer to human frailty was 
more humans. The answer to an empathy gap was spending time with the 
people for whom you lacked empathy. That while these things did not 
guarantee the development of an ethical stance, their absence guaranteed 
a kind of rootless, free-floating sociopathy.  
Doctrinal free-market thinkers have excused much sociopathy 
with the self-evident aphorism that “incentives matter.” As with “the Net 
interprets censorship, etc,” this saying references much subtext, notably 
the idea that kindness creates dependency and helplessness. It is a 
doctrine of cruelty, dressed up as pragmatism. 
But incentives do matter. Designing a system that can only be 
navigated by being a selfish bastard creates selfish bastardry, and the 
cognitive dissonance of everyday cruelties generates a kind of protective 
scar-tissue in the form of a reflex of judgment, dismissal, and cruelty. 
And contrariwise, designing a system where we celebrate civic 
duty, kindness, empathy and the giving of gifts without the expectation 
of a reward produces an environment where the angels of our better 
nature can shout down the cruel, lizard-brain impulses that mutter just 
below the threshold of perception. 
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“Freedom is the freedom to say that two plus two makes four.”3 
Generations of elevation of selfishness to virtue has produced a 
public discourse where espousing a belief in human goodness marks you 
out as a patsy at best and a dangerous idiot at worst. 
There’s a statistical illiteracy in this proposition. After all, if 99.9 
percent of the world is composed of bastards, how unlikely is it that you 
and everyone you know are just unremarkably flawed vessels whose 
nature fluctuates between reaction and reason?  
But the idea that humans are mostly OK and made worse or 
better by the stories they tell about their own nature has been in disrepute 
since the Reagan years, and without the freedom to admit this otherwise 
obvious truth, we’ve had to compose all kinds of other excuses for our 
world. 
Take the concentration of tech into Big Tech: the theorists who 
insisted that unfettered markets and doctrinal selfishness would produce 
competitive and vibrant markets find themselves scrambling to explain 
the conversion of the internet from a crazy bazaar into five big services 
filled with screenshots from the other four. They field all manner of 
unconvincing explanations for this phenomenon, like “first-mover 
advantage”4 or “network effects,”5 because they can’t say, “Dismantling 
antitrust enforcement gave rise to a new wave of trusts on a scale not 
seen since the robber-barons.”  
But if first-movers and network effects predicted success, we’d 
all be searching the internet by logging into Altavista from our Crays.  
The utterly plausible explanation for Big Tech––that we stopped 
enforcing the rules that punished underhanded growth tactics like 
mergers to monopoly––is resisted with the fervor of an anti-vaxxer 
explaining away their kid’s measles: “It’s not because I didn’t get her 
vaccinated, it’s because of environmental toxins!” 
 
3  ORWELL, supra note 1, at 109. 
4 “In marketing strategy, first-mover advantage (FMA) is the advantage gained 
by the initial (‘first-moving’) significant occupant of a market segment.”  First-
mover advantage, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First-
mover_advantage (last accessed June 9, 2019).  
5 “A network effect (also called network externality or demand-side economies 
of scale) is the effect described in economics and business that an additional 
user of a good or service has on the value of that product to others. When a 
network effect is present, the value of a product or service increases according to 
the number of others using it.” Network effect, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_effect (last accessed June 9, 2019). 
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Bigness multiplies all the risks of tech. Putting everyone’s social 
lives on Facebook creates a one-stop shop for mass-scale manipulation. 
Putting everyone’s mobile data in one of two silos creates an irresistible 
target for state surveillance. Putting everyone’s attention at the mercy of 
four or five gatekeepers turns their normal human foibles and cherishes 
illusions into facts of life that everyone else in the world must navigate.  
Think of this in analogy to climate change. Your racist Facebook 
uncle’s climate denial around the Thanksgiving table may ruin your 
digestion, but it won’t cook the planet. But change your uncle’s name to 
Koch, give him a multi-billion-dollar warchest, give it a generation, and 
before you know it we’ll be drinking our urine and digging through 
rubble looking for canned goods. 
In the same way, your idiotic college roommate’s social theory 
that “everyone should just be honest, all the time,” might make you want 
to change the locks on your dorm-room. But make that kid’s name 
Zuckerberg, put him in charge of the social lives of two billion people, 
and his bizarre belief that “Having two identities for yourself is an 
example of a lack of integrity”6 becomes an existential threat to human 
thriving. 
Implicit in the belief in bigness is a belief in a special kind of 
person, an Ayn Randian titan, whose innate superiority is so fabulous 
that any attempt to rein it in will redound to the detriment of all of us. 
Markets act as a kind of sorting hat, finding these natural rulers and 
elevating them to positions of power, and the scurrying little people’s 
misguided attempt to dethrone them must be resisted, for their own 
sakes. 
But no one is smart enough and competent enough to be the 
dictator of two billion peoples’ social lives. It’s not merely that Mark 
Zuckerberg is wrong about how people get along, it’s that no one is right 
enough to wield that power. 
Generations of insistence that some among us are born to rule, 
and revelations that the people who rise to power in that environment are 
at best fallible and at worst deplorable have created a massive 
dissonance, a great collective yearning for a One True King to lead us 
out of our dark times. 
There’s a narrative about Cambridge Analytica and the 2016 
election of a boorish white supremacist grifter to the US presidency: 
 
6 See Miguel Helft, Facebook, Foe of Anonymity, Is Forced to Explain a Secret, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2011), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/14/technology/14facebook.html. 
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Cambridge Analytica lied about everything except their sales literature, 
where they truthfully revealed that they had discovered a way to turn 
Facebook into a mind-control ray that would make decent people into 
racists. 
But there’s another, more plausible version of that narrative: 
Facebook spied on everyone and found all the racists, whose 
imperfections have a variety of causes, but prominent among them is the 
belief that some people are better than others and markets tell you who is 
and isn’t good. Having found the racists, Cambridge Analytica 
convinced them that voting for Donald Trump would advance their 
cause.  
This version of events suggests several countermeasures: make 
Facebook stop spying on people; help people see that the winners and 
losers in the marketplace are better predicted by cruelty and indifference 
to their neighbors than by virtue; ease the anxiety that everyone who 
doesn’t win big in the 21st Century lottery will lose terribly.   
That is: fix the incentives; find the better natures of people; help 
people understand and master their technology; reverse the forces that 
permit a few people to rise to dominate the rest of us.  
That is: treat the internet with the gravitas that it is due, as a 
system that could be a force for great human flourishing, but only if we 
ensure that it isn’t used to snuff out human dignity and agency. 
Barlow made his reputation by insisting, long before it was 
obvious to most people, that getting the internet’s future right would be a 
necessary precondition to getting humanity’s future right. By insisting 
that the toy network used for telling jokes and arguing about Star Trek 
would grow up to be the pluripotent network that allowed anyone, 
anywhere to talk to anyone else, anywhere, using any program or 
protocol they chose. By insisting that the internet be regulated with 
regard to all the ways that it would come to touch our lives in the 
future—and not merely as a better radio station, or a very convenient 
video-on-demand service, or a jihadi recruiting tool, or as the greatest 
pornography distribution system in human history. 
When a problem is a long way off, activists’ primary activity for 
many years is to simply convince people that there is a problem: that 
someday your cigarettes will give you cancer; that someday, climate 
change will threaten billions of lives; that someday, the text-messaging 
system called “the internet” will grow to be our species-wide, 
civilization-spanning nervous system. 
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But if the activist is right, then eventually convincing people that 
there is a problem will take care of itself. Your doctor finds a tumor. 
California burns. Burmese mobs visit genocide upon the Rohingya. 
I call that moment “peak indifference.” It’s the moment when the 
problem’s unchecked progress creates its own momentum, and every 
day, of their own accord, people recognize that the problem is there. 
After peak indifference, the activist’s job changes: now, they 
must convince people not to give in to nihilism. Because by the time a 
problem like cancer or climate or concentration is so manifest that we 
can’t deny it, it can seem like it’s too late to do anything about it.  
After peak indifference, the activist’s job changes to convincing 
people to have hope. 
Barlow never gave up hope. He was unabashedly, unashamedly, 
publicly and vocally hopeful. 
That hope plays into the narrative of techno-utopian naivete. But 
Barlow wasn’t naive. He knew how much trouble we were in––and he 
also knew how wonderful things could be, if we could only dig ourselves 
out of that trouble. The techlash isn’t a repudiation of Barlow’s 
hopefulness: it is his vindication. 
Barlow’s legacy, then, isn’t a foolish belief that history would 
steer clear of dystopia of its own accord; rather, his legacy is the noble 
belief that we, together, pluralistically and through collective reasoning 
and collective action, could navigate the dangerous waters we find 
ourselves in, patch the holes the rocks knocked in our ship, and find our 
way to a better land.  
